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Abstract
How people remember feeling in the past informs future decisions; however, memory for past emotion is subject to a number of
biases. Previous research on choice blindness has shown that people often fail to notice when they are exposed to misinformation
about their own decisions, preferences, and memories. This type of misinformation can influence how they later remember past
events. In the present study, we examined the memory blindness effect in a new domain: memory for pain. Participants (N = 269)
underwent a cold-pressor task and rated how much pain, distress, and positive and negative affect they had experienced. Later,
participants were shown their pain ratings and asked to explain them. Some of the participants were shown lower pain ratings than
they had actually made. In a second session, participants recalled how painful the task had been and how much distress and positive
and negative affect they remembered experiencing. The results indicated that the majority of participants who were exposed to
misinformation failed to detect the manipulation, and subsequently remembered the task as being less painful. The participants in the
misinformation condition were not overall more willing to repeat the study tasks, but the participants who recalled less distress, less
negative affect, and more positive affect were more willing to repeat the study tasks again in a future experiment. These results
demonstrate the malleability of memory for painful experiences and that willingness to repeat aversive experiences may dependmore
on memory for affective reactions to the original experience than on memory for the physical pain itself.
Keywords Memory .Memory blindness . Pain . Decisionmaking . Emotion
Introduction
When people are asked how willing they would be to do
something in the future, like have dinner with their in-laws
or schedule a colonoscopy, how do they determine their will-
ingness? One possibility is that they draw on information from
their memories of similar past events (Kahneman & Riis,
2005). If previous experiences with one’s in-laws have all
been positive, one might be excited to have dinner with them.
If a prior colonoscopy was painful, one might dread schedul-
ing another and put it off for as long as possible. Future
decision making is guided by memory for emotional re-
sponses to relevant past events (Levine, Lench, & Safer,
2009).
If our memories for our past emotional responses guide our
future choices, then the accuracy of those memories is highly
important. However, both memory and emotion are subject to
numerous types of error and bias (Levine et al., 2009; Loftus,
2005; Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996). For instance, memo-
ries for how we felt in the past can be reconstructed and biased
by one’s present goals and appraisals of past events (Levine
et al., 2009), as well as by beliefs about how one typically
should feel in a specific situation (e.g., McFarland, Ross, &
DeCourville, 1989; Robinson & Clore, 2002). Furthermore,
memories for emotional events are often biased toward the
peak emotional intensity experienced and the emotional inten-
sity experienced at the end of the event (Redelmeier &
Kahneman, 1996), and often fail to account for how long the
event lasted (Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, &
Redelmeier, 1993). Thus, our memories for emotionally evoc-
ative events can be biased due to natural memory processes.
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Despite the fact that memory is subject to bias, people still
rely on memories of past emotional experiences to inform
their future decisions. One study demonstrated this by expos-
ing participants to each of two different cold-pressor tasks
(Kahneman et al., 1993). One of the tasks involved partici-
pants holding one hand under circulating water at 14 °C (~ 57
°F) for 60 s; the other task began the same way as the first, and
then for 30 s more the temperature of the water increased to 15
°C (59 °F). Participants were then asked which of the two
tasks they would rather repeat. One might expect that partic-
ipants would prefer the shorter version of the task, since it
omitted 30 additional seconds of an aversive experience. But
the researchers found that more than two thirds of participants
thought the longer task caused less discomfort and preferred to
repeat the longer task, which included more total pain but a
Bbetter end.^ This study demonstrated that the natural biases
existing in memory, particularly for emotional experiences,
can lead people to make seemingly illogical decisions.
Misinformation and memory bias
Memories can also be biased due to external influences. For
instance, if people are shown misinformation about an event
they previously witnessed, their memories about that event are
often biased by the misinformation (see Loftus, 2005, for a
review). Research using a Bfalse feedback^ paradigm has indi-
cated that faultymemories can affect future decisionmaking and
behaviors (see Bernstein & Loftus, 2009, for a review). In these
studies, participants are typically given a questionnaire assessing
their histories eating different foods. Later, they are told their
questionnaire was fed into a computer program that suggested
they had had certain childhood experiences with particular
foods, such as getting sick after eating strawberry ice cream.
These studies have demonstrated that many participants come
to remember this false event, report decreased preference for the
foods implicated, and even eat less of that food when given the
opportunity. Conversely, when false feedback is given suggest-
ing something positive about a particular food, participants’
preference for that food increases. Taken together, these studies
demonstrate that implanted memories, not just naturally biased
memories, can have important consequences for future decision
making (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009).
Choice blindness
One method of implanting misinformation is by utilizing the
choice blindness procedure. Choice blindness occurs when
people are misled about their own decisions and evaluations.
In a seminal study, participants were shown two pictures
depicting different female faces and asked to select the one
they found more attractive (Johansson, Hall, Sikström, &
Olsson, 2005). After making their decision, participants were
given the photograph they selected and asked to justify why
they made the choice they did. However, on certain trials, a
sleight-of-hand manipulation took place whereby the photo-
graph participants were given was the nonselected photograph
instead of the one they had selected. Not only did a majority of
people fail to detect when their decisions had been manipulat-
ed, but they generated reasons why they made decisions they
had never truly made. Choice blindness has been examined in
a variety of contexts, including financial decision making
(McLaughlin & Somerville, 2013), taste-testing of grocery
products (Hall, Johansson, Tärning, Sikström, & Deutgen,
2010), and even one’s own reported history of criminal and
norm-violating behavior (Sauerland et al., 2013).
Memory blindness
The choice blindness paradigm, which is typically tested in the
context of short-term attitude change, has recently been extend-
ed into studies on memory, in which researchers investigate
whether choice blindness can lead to memory change
(Cochran, Greenspan, Bogart, & Loftus, 2016; Stille, Norin, &
Sikström, 2017). In one such experiment, participants watched a
simulated crime and were then asked to answer questions about
the event, such as Bhow tall was the thief?^ (Cochran et al.,
2016). Later, they were shown their responses to these questions
and asked additional follow-up questions. However, for misin-
formation items, participants’ responses had been manipulated
(e.g., the reported height of the thief was increased or de-
creased). Participants were asked to report their memories for
the initial event again later in the session. The researchers found
that for misinformation items, participants’ memories shifted in
the direction of the misinformation they received, whereas par-
ticipants’ memories did not shift for control items. In a second
study, participants watched a simulated crime and were asked to
identify the perpetrator from a lineup. After receiving misinfor-
mation suggesting that they had identified a different person
than they actually had, participants were more likely to switch
their identification in a subsequent lineup. These studies dem-
onstrate the downstream consequences of choice blindness: not
only do people often fail to detect misinformation about their
own memory reports, their subsequent memories can become
biased by the misinformation they receive.
Misinformation and healthcare
Healthcare settings might be one context in which misinfor-
mation could be especially consequential. Patients are often
asked by medical professionals to describe their physical and
psychological symptoms as well as their levels of pain and
discomfort. People may be susceptible to remembering their
symptoms or pain differently as a result of misinformation,
which could then influence the healthcare decisions theymake
in the future. On the other hand, pain might be less amenable
to misinformation than are other affective experiences, given
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the salience of pain in the moment and thus greater attention to
the details of the experience (Eccleston & Crombez, 1999).
Therefore, it is unclear whether memory for pain could be
altered by misinformation in the same way it is susceptible
to natural memory biases (e.g., peak and end bias; Redelmeier
& Kahneman, 1996).
A handful of studies have utilized misinformation in the con-
text of psychological and physical healthcare. One study
employed false feedback to influence peoples’ overall memories
for painful, stressful, and uncomfortable procedures. In this
study, the researchers examined children who had received their
diphtheria pertussis tetanus shots (Bruck, Ceci, Francoeur, &
Barr, 1995). Approximately 11 months after the inoculations,
the children participated in three interviews in which they re-
ceived either neutral or pain-denying feedback (i.e., feedback
that the shot did not hurt). The participants who received the
pain-denying feedback remembered less pain and also that they
had cried less than those who received neutral feedback.
Another study misled participants about the frequency with
which they reported experiencing psychological symptoms,
such as repeated unpleasant thoughts (Merckelbach, Jelicic, &
Pieters, 2011). Participants reported their symptoms using a 0–4
scale, where 0 indicated not at all and 4 indicated all the time.
Later, participants were shown their responses to some of the
items and were asked to recall why they gave those ratings.
However, the researchers surreptitiously increased participants’
ratings on two items by two scale points. Participants were then
given the questionnaire a second time for an immediate retest,
and were given the questionnaire a third time one week later.
The researchers found that 63% of participants were unaware
of the manipulation. Furthermore, whereas these Bblind^ partic-
ipants did not differ in their ratings of manipulated and control
symptoms at baseline, they rated the manipulated symptoms
significantly higher at both immediate and one-week follow-
ups. Nonblind participants showed no difference between ma-
nipulated and control symptoms at any time. A more recent
article replicated these findings using a symptom checklist that
included both psychological and somatic symptoms and dem-
onstrated that participants could also be led to underestimate
their symptom ratings as a result of misinformation
(Merckelbach, Dalsklev, Van Helvoort, Boskovic, & Otgaar,
2018). These studies illustrate that people can be misinformed
about their own internal states. Moreover, this misinformation
causes people to report feeling differently; if they are told they
reported having more unpleasant thoughts, they actually report
experiencing more unpleasant thoughts.
The aforementioned studies examined whether misinfor-
mation, and more specifically memory blindness, could be
used to change memory for physical and psychological symp-
toms. To our knowledge, no study has examined memory
blindness for physical pain ratings among adults, nor how
memory blindness in a health relevant setting might be used
to make health-related decisions in the future. One potential
application of using memory blindness in a medical setting is
to increase compliance for routine, yet mildly painful, medical
procedures. If patients recall pain experienced in the medical
setting as less painful than they originally reported, they may
be more willing to seek out medical care in the future.
Leveraging memory bias to increase compliance for routine
medical procedures is not necessarily novel. One study used
the principle of duration neglect to increase the odds that pa-
tients would return for a repeat colonoscopy by subjecting
them to a longer initial colonoscopy (but ended with a
period of less intense pain; Redelmeier, Katz, & Kahneman,
2003). Although this study was successful at increasing med-
ical compliance, memory blindness provides a potential ave-
nue to alter memory for painful experiences without extending
the duration of the pain.
The present study
The goal of the present study was twofold: (1) to extend the
memory blindness literature to the domain of physical pain
and examine whether memory blindness can be used to reduce
remembered pain experienced during a painful laboratory
task, and (2) to examine how memory for pain (whether ac-
curate or retrospectively biased) might influence intentions for
future behavior as measured through willingness to repeat the
painful task.
Participants were recruited for a two-session study. In the
first session, participants underwent a cold pressor task
(Mitchell, MacDonald, & Brodie, 2004). The cold pressor is
a well-established pain induction technique, because the dis-
comforts are relatively short lived (the task only lasts a few
minutes) and normal sensation is recovered rapidly. In the
stress reactivity literature, it is considered a noninvasive meth-
od of inducing a cardiovascular response (Goyal, Shimbo,
Mostofsky, & Gerin, 2008). Immediately following the task,
participants rated how painful the experience was on a 100-
point scale. They also rated how much distress and positive
and negative affect they felt during the task. Later in the first
session, participants were reminded of the pain rating they had
produced and asked to elaborate on why they had rated their
pain the way they did. However, unbeknownst to the partici-
pants, those in the misinformation group were told they had
rated their pain 20 points lower than they truly had.
Participants returned to the lab one to two days later and were
asked to recall how painful the task was and how much dis-
tress and positive and negative affect they had experienced, to
rate how willing they would be to participate in a similar
experiment again in the future, and to recommend how much
money participants should be compensated in a similar exper-
iment in the future.
We expected that the majority of participants in the misin-
formation condition would fail to detect the misinformation
about their pain ratings. We hypothesized that the difference
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between recalled and experienced pain would be larger for the
participants exposed to the misinformation than for controls,
particularly for those who failed to detect the misinformation.
We also hypothesized that the more pain that the participants
in both conditions remembered from the task, the less willing
they would be to repeat the experience and the more compen-
sation they would recommend paying participants for a future
study. Since the participants in the misinformation condition
were given misinformation indicating that they had reported
experiencing less pain, we expected them to recall less pain
and to report being more willing to undergo a similar study in
the future than controls would be. However, we predicted that
these effects would be attenuated for those participants who
detected the misinformation.
Supplementary analyses were also performed to test wheth-
er misinformation regarding pain ratings influenced recollec-
tions of distress, positive affect, and negative affect. Although
these relationships were not of primary interest, we wanted to
test whether the misinformation manipulation had more local-
ized (i.e., constrained only to pain) or more global (i.e., trans-
ferring to affective responses related to pain) effects. Because
experiences of pain often produce affective responses, we pre-
dicted that underestimating pain due to the misinformation
would be related to also underestimating distress and negative
affect and overestimating positive affect. Regardless of the
effect of the pain misinformation on recalled distress, positive
affect, and negative affect, we predicted that participants
would be more willing to repeat the study tasks, the less dis-
tress, the less negative affect, and the more positive affect they
had experienced during the task and recalled during the fol-
low-up.
Method
Participants
The overall sample size was determined on the basis of expe-
rience with previous choice blindness research (Cochran et al.,
2016). We wanted to recruit a sufficient sample to observe
many detectors and nondetectors, in the case that our manip-
ulation had either a high or low rate of detection. A total of 303
eligible participants were recruited from the university’s hu-
man participant research pool in exchange for course credit.
Participants between the ages of 18 and 35 were eligible for
the study but were screened out if they had an injury to their
nondominant hand, had Reynaud’s disease or a similar circu-
latory problem, had vasovagal syncope, had ever fainted or
had a seizure, were pregnant, or regularly took mood-altering,
pain-altering, or cardiovascular-functioning medication.
These exclusions were used for safety reasons and for their
potential influence on emotional responses to the cold pressor.
A subset of participants were excluded from the analyses
because of incomplete data (n = 10) or equipment malfunction
(n = 24).
The final sample of 269 participants (control group n =
134, misinformation group n = 135) was 82.5% female,
17.5% male, and 50.2% Asian/Pacific Islander, 31.6%
Hispanic/Latino, 8.9% White, 1.5% African American, 4.8%
biracial, and 3% other race/ethnicity. The mean age of the
participants was 21 years old (SD = 2.32, range = 18–33).
Of these participants, 244 completed the second study session;
233 (95.5%) of these did so one or two days following their
initial session, and these participants composed the final sam-
ple (control group n = 111, misinformation group n = 122).
The other 11 participants completed the second session either
on the same day as the first session or three or more days
following the first session, and are not included in analyses
on the data collected during Session 2.
Design and procedure
Session 1
All study procedures were approved by the university’s
Institutional Review Board. Participants were first given de-
tails about the study, including the cold pressor. After agreeing
to participate, they completed an eligibility questionnaire.
Those who did not meet the eligibility criteria were dismissed
and received partial course credit. If participants met the eli-
gibility criteria, they completed a series of baseline question-
naires, including questions on emotional states, while the cold
pressor was being prepared.
Cold-pressor taskAfter the baseline period was completed, the
research assistant brought in a bucket filled with water mea-
suring 4 °C (± 0.4 °C) with a thermometer attached to the
bucket out of the participant’s sight. The bucket was also
affixed to a motorized water-circulating pump to ensure con-
stant flow of water around the participant’s hand. The research
assistant then instructed participants to place their nondomi-
nant hand in the bucket of cold water for 90 s. Participants
were told they could remove their hand if the task became too
uncomfortable and they felt they were unable to finish.
Recovery period Immediately after the participant removed his
or her hand from the water bucket, a 5-min recovery period
began. Participants rated on 100-point sliding scales how
painful the task had been and how much distress, positive
affect, and negative affect they had experienced during the
task. After they finished these questionnaires, they were asked
to sit quietly until the resting period was over.
Misinformation manipulation Once the resting period was
completed, participants were instructed to complete a final set
of questionnaires that included a prompt reminding them of the
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pain score they had made immediately following the cold pres-
sor. Participants were asked, BWeare interested in understanding
what the experience of putting your hand in cold water was like
for you. Earlier in the study, on a scale from 1 to 100,1 you rated
your pain as a ____. What made you rate the task in that way?
Please be detailed in your response.^ The computer program
randomly assigned participants to either the control condition
or the misinformation condition. In the control condition, par-
ticipants were reminded of the actual pain score they had report-
ed earlier. In the misinformation condition, participants were
told they had given a pain score that was 20 points lower than
the one they had reported earlier. Once all questionnaires were
completed, participants were partially debriefed (the fact that
pain ratings had been altered for half the participants was with-
held) and dismissed from the study.
Session 2
One to two days following the first study session (M = 1.28
days, SD = 0.49), participants returned and completed a series
of questionnaires. Participants were asked to report again how
much pain, distress, positive affect, and negative affect they
had experienced during the cold pressor, using the same word-
ing and 100-point sliding scale from the first session. At a
predetermined time between questionnaires, after all questions
regarding memory for the cold pressor, the research assistant
interrupted participants to ask them to fill out a paper-based
survey that was ostensibly unrelated to the present study (see
the Measures section). After the survey was completed, par-
ticipants finished the set of questionnaires on the computer
and were debriefed. Part of the debriefing portion included
questions assessing whether participants had detected the mis-
information since the first session.
Measures
Pain, distress, and overall positive and negative affect
Immediately following the cold pressor, participants were
asked to rate how much pain, distress, and positive and neg-
ative affect2 they had felt during the cold pressor, on sliding
scales of 0No pain/distress/positive emotion/negative emotion
to 100 Most pain/distress/positive emotion/negative emotion
imaginable. At follow-up, participants were asked these same
questions regarding pain, distress, and affect again, on the
same scale. The items regarding distress and affect were
included to test whether misinformation regarding the pain
reports might influence the recalled distress and affect, or
whether the manipulation would exclusively lower recalled
pain in memory.
Social desirability
The Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne &
Marlow, 1960), which includes 33 questions that are answered
either Btrue^ or Bfalse,^was used tomeasure the extent to which
participants tended to present themselves in socially desirable
ways. An example item is BMy table manners at home are as
good as when I eat out in a restaurant.^ The socially desirable
responses endorsed (15 of which are reverse-coded) are then
added up to create a total social desirability score, which ranges
from 0 to 33. We used the scores from this scale to measure the
potential influence of demand effects on pain ratings and the
tendency to report detection of the misinformation. People
who have high social desirability may be more likely not to
report that they detected misinformation (even if they did detect
it) and may also report lower pain, distress, and negative affect
ratings and higher positive affect and willingness ratings.
Concurrent and retrospective detection of misinformation
On the basis of prior choice andmemory blindness research, two
measures were created to record whether participants detected
that their pain ratings had been manipulated. To assess whether
participants detected the misinformation concurrently (i.e., in re-
sponse to the presentation of the misinformation), three trained
coders evaluated the participants’ typed responses to the open-
ended question asking them to elaborate on why they had given
that specific pain rating after being reminded of the pain rating. If
two of the three trained coders flagged a response as revealing
suspicionthat thenumber theywerebeingshownwasnotactually
their truerating, theparticipantwascodedasaconcurrentdetector.
For example, if a participant typed, Bthat rating is lower than the
one I gave, thewaterwas actually pretty painful,^ that participant
would be labeled as a concurrent detector.
A second measure of detection was created based on the
responses provided in the second session (retrospective detec-
tion of misinformation). The labeling of this variable as
Bretrospective^ is intended to reflect when participants
revealed that they had noticed the misinformation, rather than
when they had actually noticed it. That is, it is possible that
participants could have noticed the misinformation during the
first session (concurrently) but not revealed their suspicions
until the second session (retrospectively). Participants were
asked during the debriefing whether they remembered being
reminded of their pain rating score during the first session and
being asked to write about their pain experience. The research
assistant, who was unaware of the participant’s condition, then
asked, BDid you notice anything strange about this process?^
1 The scale on which participants reported their pain ranged from 0 to 100, but
due to a clerical error, the critical manipulation read B1 to 100.^ It was not
expected that this would have any influence on the results of the present study.
2 Questions regarding positive and negative affect consisted of one item each.
The participant saw the word Bemotion^ in place of the word Baffect,^ but
since these questions were regarding general positive or negative states, we
refer to these measures as positive and negative affect throughout the article.
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The research assistant recorded the participant’s verbal re-
sponse in the study notes, which was later coded by trained
coders. Participants were coded as retrospective detectors if
they mentioned finding anything strange about the process
(e.g., BI noticed the computer gave me a lower pain rating^),
unless what they found strange was irrelevant to the study’s
hypotheses (e.g., BI was surprised by how many question-
naires there were^). Three research assistants independently
coded each participant’s response to these questions, and par-
ticipants were labeled as detectors if at least two of the re-
search assistants coded them as such.
Willingness to participate in a similar future task
During the second session, participants were given a paper-
based survey that was ostensibly designed to measure their
opinions regarding the study, so that researchers would know
how much to pay future participants in a similar study. The
questions that were asked were instead intended to measure
how willing the participant was to repeat the cold-pressor
experience. The survey included the questions BHow willing
would you be to participate in an experiment similar to this
one in the future?^ on a scale of 1 Not at all willing to 5
Extremely willing, and, BHow much do you think we should
pay our participants?,^ which was open-ended. Because these
items did not distinguish between the whole study and just the
cold-pressor portion (which was the portion that the main
manipulation targeted), we altered these two questions for
the final 49 participants3 to specify their relevance to complet-
ing the entire study, including the cold pressor. The same
subset of participants also saw two additional questions asking
how willing they would be to do just the cold-water task, on a
scale of 1 Not at all willing to 5 Extremely willing (asked
before the willingness question regarding the entire study)
and how much future participants should be paid to do just
the cold-water portion of the study, on a scale from $0 to $60
(in $5 increments, asked before the compensation question
regarding the entire study).
Results
In cases in which the assumption of homogeneity of variances
was violated, corrected statistics are presented. This is partic-
ularly relevant for analyses concerning detection status, where
unequal cell sizes make the violation of this assumption more
likely. For the analyses relating to our main hypotheses, we
report the Bayes factor in addition to listing the effect size and
level of significance. Bayes factors (BFs) allow for a compar-
ison of the likelihood that the observed data fit with the null
hypothesis (H0), as compared to the likelihood that the data fit
with the alternative hypothesis (H1; see Wagenmakers,
Marsman, et al., 2018b). The statistical software JASP, ver-
sion 0.9, was used to calculate BFs (JASP Team, 2018). A
BF10 refers to the relative likelihood that the observed data fit
the alternative hypothesis (represented by the subscript 1) as
compared to the null hypothesis (represented by the subscript
0). Whereas a BF10 of less than 1 indicates more evidence in
support ofH0, a BF10 of more than 1 indicates some degree of
evidence in support ofH1 (Wagenmakers, Love, et al., 2018a).
BF10s greater than 3 are considered at least moderate evidence
for H1 (1–3 is considered anecdotal evidence; 10–30 is con-
sidered strong, 30–100 is considered very strong, and greater
than 100 is considered extreme evidence in support of H1).
Descriptive statistics
A total of 179 participants4 (66.5%) completed the entire 90 s
cold-pressor period. The average length of time for those who
removed their hand early was 36.19 s (SD = 19.11 s). A signif-
icant Shapiro–Wilk test (p < .001) demonstrated that the number
of seconds that participants kept their hand in the water was
significantly skewed (– 1.09, SE = 0.15); thus, nonparametric
tests were conducted to examine any relationships with this
variable. Mann–Whitney U tests revealed that men and women
did not differ significantly in how long they kept their hand in
the water (p = .113), and that cold-pressor duration did not vary
as a function of condition (p = .513). Using Spearman’s corre-
lations, we found that the longer participants that kept their hand
in the water, the less pain they reported experiencing during the
cold pressor, rs (268) = – .13, p = .031. The amount of time they
kept their hand submerged in the water was not related to dis-
tress, positive affect, or negative affect during the cold pressor,
ps > .08. Participants in misinformation conditions did not differ
significantly in gender composition, χ2(1) = 0.04, p = .850, or
reported pain, distress, positive affect, or negative affect experi-
enced during the cold pressor, ps > .32. See Table 1 for descrip-
tive statistics regarding reported and recalled pain, distress, pos-
itive affect, and negative affect as a function of condition.
Social desirability
Average levels of social desirability were similar across con-
ditions, t(231) = – 0.98, p = .327. Social desirability was not
related to the amount of time participants kept their hand in the
water, their reported pain, or their reported distress during the
cold pressor, ps > .08. People who detected the misinforma-
tion concurrently scored lower on the measure of social
3 The question regarding payment for the entire study for these 49 participants
was on a scale of $0 to $60 (in $5 increments).
4 Due to experimenter error, a total of 93 s elapsed before one participant was
instructed to remove their hand. This participant was not included when using
seconds in water as a continuous variable, but was included in analyses using
whether or not participants removed their hand before 90 s.
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desirability than did those who did not detect the misinforma-
tion, t(120) = 3.09, p = .002, as did people who detected the
misinformation retrospectively, t(120) = 1.98, p = .05, al-
though this difference for the retrospective detectors did not
reach significance.
Higher levels of social desirability were related to higher
positive affect and lower negative affect during the cold pres-
sor, rs > |.13|, ps < .033. Furthermore, levels of social desir-
ability were related to recalling less pain, less distress, less
negative affect, and more positive affect during the second
study session, rs > |.21|, ps < .002. People higher in social
desirability were also more willing to participate in a future
research study, r(231) = .14, p = .038, but social desirability
scores were not related to suggested payment for future par-
ticipants, rs < .18, ps > .257.
Because social desirability was related to recalling less
pain, we ran a correlation among the participants in the mis-
information condition to explore whether people with higher
levels of social desirability were more susceptible to the mis-
information. Higher levels of social desirability were related
to a greater underestimation of pain at Session 2, r(120) = –
.32, p < .001, suggesting that the participants with higher
levels of social desirability were more susceptible to the
misinformation.
Detection of misinformation
Coder agreement for classifying whether participants were
concurrent or retrospective detectors was high (all average
pairwise percent agreements ≥ 95%, all Krippendorff’s alphas
≥ .75). Of the participants in the misinformation condition,
only 14 (11%) detected the misinformation concurrently. No
participant in the control condition was judged to be a concur-
rent detector. For retrospective detection, 42 (34.4%) of the
participants in the misinformation condition were coded as
detectors, whereas seven control participants (6.3%) were
coded as detectors. For the subsequent analyses, only the par-
ticipants in the misinformation condition who were coded as
detectors were considered detectors; the control condition was
not partitioned.
It should be emphasized that detection status is a quasi-
independent variable that characterizes differences between
misinformation participants but cannot be randomly assigned
or experimentally manipulated. Therefore, any relationship
between detection status and a dependent variable reported
here is correlational in nature. Furthermore, any conclusions
drawn from analyses with small cell means (as in the case of
concurrent detectors) should be interpreted with caution and
replicated with a larger sample size.
Participants who detected the misinformation concurrently
reported marginally more pain, t(133) = – 1.98, p = .05, and
significantly more distress, t(24.55) = – 3.87, p = .001, and
negative affect, t(133) = – 3.23, p = .002, during the cold
pressor than did those who did not detect the misinformation
concurrently. As compared to nondetectors, a greater propor-
tion of the concurrent detectors took their hand out of the
water before 90 s had elapsed, χ2(1) = 7.01, p = .008.
Detection status did not vary as a function of gender, χ2(1)
= 0.16, p = .686.
Participants who detected the misinformation retrospec-
tively did not differ from nondetectors in levels of reported
pain, t(120) = – 0.40, p = .691, or distress, t(120) = – 1.66, p =
.099, but they did report significantly higher negative affect,
t(120) = – 2.78, p = .006, and significantly lower positive
affect, t(118.91) = 2.85, p = .005, during the task. A similar
proportion of participants pulled their hand out of the water
early, regardless of retrospective detection status, χ2(1) =
0.06, p = .80, and retrospective detection status did not vary
as a function of gender, χ2(1) = 1.45, p = .229.
Memory bias for pain
To assess bias in participants’ memory for the cold pressor, a
mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed with the
pain rating type entered as the within-participants variable
(experienced pain vs. recalled pain) and condition entered as
the between-participants variable (control vs. misinforma-
tion). No main effect of condition was found, F(1, 231) =
1.00, p = .319, ηp
2 = .004. A main effect of rating type was
found, F(1, 231) = 128.21, p < .001, ηp
2 = .36, as was a
Table 1 Experienced and recalled pain, distress, negative affect, and positive affect by condition
Pain Distress Negative Affect Positive Affect
Experienced M (SD)
Control 67.30 (19.48) 62.58 (22.41) 56.19 (24.47) 16.96 (18.31)
Misinformation 68.70 (20.23) 61.13 (23.28) 57.59 (26.67) 16.20 (19.31)
Recalled M (SD)
Control 64.38 (19.84) 61.64 (22.82) 56.01 (24.54) 18.75 (19.23)
Misinformation 57.79 (21.89) 56.24 (25.38) 54.29 (25.93) 20.91 (21.85)
Control group: n = 134 for experienced ratings, n = 111 for recalled ratings; misinformation group: n = 135 for experienced ratings, n = 122 for recalled
ratings.
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significant interaction between condition and pain rating type,
F(1, 231) = 37.03, p < .001, ηp
2 = .14. The model including
the main effects of condition and rating type as well as their
interaction had the highest BF10, of 1.18e25, indicating that
including the interaction in the model provided the best fit for
the data. Overall, participants tended to underestimate how
painful the cold pressor was in their recollections, but the
participants in the misinformation condition underestimated
their pain during recall (Mdiff = – 11.56) to a greater degree
than did those in the control condition (Mdiff = – 3.48). A
paired t test revealed that although the participants in the con-
trol condition underestimated their pain to a lesser degree,
their recalled pain was still significantly lower than their re-
ported pain, t(110) = 3.85, p < .001, BF10 = 86.51. See Fig. 1
for a graphical representation of this relationship.
To determine whether concurrent detection of the
misinformation was associated with participants’ bias
in their memories for their pain, a 3 (detection status:
control vs. nondetectors vs. detectors) by 2 (report type:
experience vs. memory) mixed ANOVA was conducted.
This analysis revealed a main effect of concurrent de-
tector group status, F(2, 230) = 5.25, p = .006, ηp
2 =
.04; a main effect of report type, F(1, 230) = 31.29, p <
.001, ηp
2 = .12; and a significant interaction between
concurrent detector group status and report type, F(2,
230) = 32.60, p < .001, ηp
2 = .22. The BF10 for the
model that included the main effects of condition and
rating type as well as their interaction was the largest,
at 1.20e30. A follow-up one-way ANOVA and a
Games–Howell post-hoc test for multiple comparisons
revealed that the degrees of memory bias were signifi-
cantly different across all three groups, ps < .048. As
can be seen in Fig. 2, the participants in the misinfor-
mation condition who failed to detect the misinforma-
tion concurrently showed the greatest memory bias for
pain (Mdiff = – 13.11), followed by the participants in
the control condition (Mdiff = – 3.48). A series of
paired-sample t tests showed that the degrees of under-
estimation were significant for both the control condi-
t i on and t h e g roup t h a t d i d no t d e t e c t t h e
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Fig. 1. Experienced and recalled pain by condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Control group n = 111,misinformation group n = 122
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Fig. 2. Experienced and recalled pain by concurrent detection status. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals
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misinformation, ts > 3.81, ps < .001, BF10 > 86.50.
Participants in the misinformation condition who detect-
ed the misinformation concurrently, however, showed no
significant memory bias (Mdiff = 0.43), t(13) = – 0.34, p
= .74, BF10 = 0.28.
A similar 3×2 mixed ANOVA was computed to deter-
mine whether retrospective detection status influenced the
bias participants exhibited in their memories for their
pain. The results indicated no main effect of retrospective
group detection status, F(2, 230) = 1.07, p = .34, ηp
2 =
.01. There was a significant main effect of pain rating
time point, F(1, 230) = 138.42, p < .001, ηp
2 = .38, which
was qualified by an interaction with retrospective group
detection status, F(2, 230) = 22.41, p < .001, ηp
2 = .16.
As with the previous two mixed ANOVAs, the BF10 was
largest for the model incorporating both main effects and
the interaction of detection status and rating time point,
with a BF10 of 4.80e25. Overall, participants tended to
underestimate how much pain they had experienced when
asked at recall, but a follow-up one-way ANOVA and
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparison tests revealed
that the degrees of bias were significantly different across
all three groups, ps < .029. Follow-up paired-sample t
tests revealed that all three groups tended to underesti-
mate their pain significantly, ts > 3.82, ps < .001, BF10
> 86.50, but memory bias for pain was the greatest for
participants who did not detect the misinformation retro-
spectively (Mdiff = – 13.28). Those who detected the mis-
information retrospectively still demonstrated a significant
memory bias (Mdiff = – 8.29), which was greater than the
bias shown by the participants in the control condition
(Mdiff = – 3.48). Together, the results of these analyses
suggest that people tended to recall the cold pressor as
being less painful than they had initially reported it as
being one to two days earlier, but this underestimation
was magnified for those in the misinformation condition,
particularly for those who did not detect the misinforma-
tion retrospectively (see Fig. 3).
Willingness to participate in the future
We computed correlations between recalled pain and our four
measures of willingness (willingness for the entire study,
willingness for just the cold pressor, recommended payment
for the entire study, and recommended payment for just the
cold pressor; see Table 2 for descriptive statistics broken down
by condition).5 As can be seen in Table 3, we found one
significant, yet weak, relationship: The more pain that partic-
ipants recalled, the more compensation they recommended for
future participants in the overall study.6 There was no signif-
icant relationship between recalled pain and any of the other
three willingness measures. We also found that pain experi-
enced during the cold pressor was not related to any of the
willingness variables. Given that willingness only varied as a
function of recalled pain for recommended overall compensa-
tion, we tested for condition differences in willingness using
this variable only. We found no differences between the mis-
information and control groups in how much compensation
they recommended future participants receive, regardless of
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Fig. 3. Experienced and recalled pain by retrospective detection status. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals
5 Independent-samples t tests were conducted to test for differences in re-
sponses as a result of changes in the question wording. These tests revealed
no significant differences in willingness as a function of the old versus new
wording for the whole sample, for themisinformation group, or for controls, ps
< .09. The amount recommended that future participants be paid did vary as a
function of the old versus new wording for the whole sample and for the
misinformation group, ps < .02, but not for controls, p = .539. Given these
findings, the first willingness question was combined, regardless of the word-
ing change (for a total n = 233), but suggested payment was analyzed sepa-
rately, depending onwhether participants were given the open-ended (n = 184)
or scale (n = 49) question format. Analyses regarding willingness and payment
specifically for the cold pressor included n = 49.
6 This analysis was performed with the participants who recommended com-
pensation in the open-ended question (n = 184). The same analysis for partic-
ipants who recommended compensation in the interval-scale question (n = 49)
was nonsignificant, r(47) = – .14, p = .339.
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whether the questionwas asked in open-ended or scale format,
ts < 1.64, ps > .10, BF10 < 0.61.
Predicting willingness for future behavior
Since pain was not related to willingness to participate in a
similar future study, we conducted a series of exploratory cor-
relational analyses to assess whether distress, positive affect,
or negative affect might be related to willingness (see Table 3).
We found that participants were more willing to complete a
similar future study if they recalled less distress, less negative
emotion, and more positive emotion.7 Experienced distress
and experienced negative affect reported during the cold pres-
sor, however, were not significantly related to willingness.
Positive affect experienced during the cold pressor was related
to greater willingness to participate in a similar future study.8
These analyses should be interpreted with caution, however,
due to their exploratory nature and the inflated risk for Type I
errors, given the presence of multiple comparisons.
Memory bias for distress, positive affect, and negative
affect
We explored whether misinforming participants of their pain
rating carried over to their memory for the amounts of distress,
positive affect, and negative affect they experienced during
the cold pressor. To test this, three mixed ANOVAs were
computed with condition as the between-participants variable
(control vs. misinformation) and report type as the within-
participants variable (experienced vs. recalled) for distress,
positive affect, and negative affect separately. In all three
ANOVAs, no main effect was found for condition, Fs <
1.54, ps > .21, but the main effect for report type was signif-
icant, Fs > 4.82, ps < .03. Thus, participants tended to under-
estimate the distress and negative affect they had experienced
when later recalling how they had felt during the cold pressor,
and they tended to overestimate howmuch positive affect they
had experienced. Contrary to our hypothesis, the interaction
between condition and reporting session was not significant
for any of the three models, ps > .09, demonstrating that mis-
information regarding their pain rating did not influence par-
ticipants’ memory for their emotional reactions to the cold
pressor.
Discussion
This study demonstrated that people can be misled about their
own reports of the pain they experienced from a cold pressor.
Participants who received misinformation regarding their re-
ported pain later exhibited a greater memory bias (i.e.,
underestimated their pain rating to a greater extent) than did
control participants who did not receive misinformation. This
effect was amplified for participants who failed to detect that
they had been given misinformation about their pain ratings.
Participants who retrospectively detected the misinformation
exhibited a greater reduction in their pain ratings than did
control participants, but a lesser reduction than participants
who failed to detect the misinformation retrospectively.
However, participants who concurrently detected the misin-
formation did not exhibit a reduction in their pain ratings.
These findings are consistent with past research demonstrating
that people can be led to misremember their own reports on
their internal states (Merckelbach et al., 2018), that choice
blindness can have lasting effects for memory (i.e., memory
blindness; Cochran et al., 2016; Stille et al., 2017), and that
when people detect the discrepancy between misinformation
and facts, they are less likely to be swayed by the misinfor-
mation (Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 1986). These findings
add to the literature by demonstrating that memory blindness
can be found in memory for a painful, lived experience, not
just in symptoms on a checklist.
This study also examined the influence of biased memory
for pain on intentions for future behavior. Memories for past
experiences are used to inform decisions made in similar sit-
uations in the future (Levine et al., 2009). Despite this, in the
present study we found only weak evidence that remembered
pain was used to inform willingness to repeat the painful ex-
perience in the future (recalled pain was weakly related to
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the willingness and compensation variables by condition
Whole-Study Willingness M (SD) Cold-Pressor WillingnessM (SD)
Willingnessa Compensation (Open-ended)b Compensation (13-point scale)c Willingnessc Compensationc
Control group 3.95 (0.89) 15.27 (14.09) 17.20 (12.51) 3.56 (1.00) 13.20 (9.45)
Misinformation group 4.02 (0.93) 12.44 (8.36) 21.67 (17.30) 3.58 (1.21) 15.73 (12.54)
Due to changes in the willingness questionnaire mid-study, sample size for each measure differ. For control group: a n = 111. b n = 86. c n = 25. For
misinformation group: a n = 122. b n = 98. c n = 24.
7 When running these correlations separately by condition, the results were
similar, except that the relationship between willingness and recalled negative
emotion among control participants was no longer significant, r(111) = – .16, p
= .094, BF10 = 0.47.
8 But this was not the case when running the correlation among controls only,
r(111) = .14, p = .143, BF10 = 0.34.
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suggesting less compensation for future participants when the
question was asked in an open-ended format). Instead, explor-
atory analyses revealed that memory for affective experiences
related to the pain, such as distress, negative affect, and pos-
itive affect, might instead be more influential on behavioral
intentions to repeat painful tasks. Replication of these findings
is warranted, as is further research to determine the role played
by affective memory biases in the willingness to repeat painful
experiences.
Memory blindness for pain
Past research has shown that pain is susceptible to naturally
occurring memory biases (Kahneman et al., 1993; Redelmeier
&Kahneman, 1996). Because of the attention-grabbing nature
of pain (Eccleston & Crombez, 1999), it is reasonable to be-
lieve that memories of pain might be less amenable to the
influence of misinformation. Contrary to this intuition, the
present study demonstrated that participants in the misinfor-
mation condition exhibited a greater decrease in their memory
for pain than did those in the control condition, particularly
when they did not detect the misinformation. It seems, then,
that pain is not different from the typical targets of memory
blindness studies, in that memory of pain is indeed susceptible
to external influences. There may be a limit on the extent of
this susceptibility, however, since the participants in the mis-
in fo rmat ion condi t ion were less suscep t ib le to
underestimating their pain levels the more pain they had ini-
tially reported during the task.
Predicting willingness for similar future experiences
Contrary to our hypothesis, recalled pain was related to only
one of four indices intended to measure willingness for under-
going a similar lab experience in the future. The single
significant, yet weak, correlation revealed that the more pain
participants recalled, the more money they recommended fu-
ture participants be compensated for the entire experiment.
Recalled pain was not related to any other index of willing-
ness, and experienced pain was not related to any of the will-
ingness indices. Furthermore, we found no differences in will-
ingness between the misinformation and control condition,
which were designed to vary solely as a function of recalled
pain. These findings together suggest that participants did not
rely on remembered pain when making their decisions about
willingness to undergo a similar experience in the future.
Although initially counterintuitive, this may make sense in
the context of past research in which participants preferred
the study task that involved more overall pain (by choosing
the longer procedure) rather than the task that involved less
pain (Kahneman et al., 1993). In that study and in ours, par-
ticipants seemed to be using something other than memory for
pain to make decisions for the future.
If people do not rely on their memory for how painful an
experience was to decide how willing they are to repeat it
again in the future, what informs that decision? Results from
exploratory correlational analyses demonstrated that willing-
ness to repeat the overall study again was related to memory
for emotional experiences during the cold pressor, including
recalled distress, positive affect, and negative affect. As for the
emotional experiences reported during the cold pressor, will-
ingness was only related to experienced positive affect, but not
to experienced negative affect or distress. This implies that
intentions to repeat past aversive experiences are more strong-
ly related to memory for emotional responses to the aversive
experience and not necessarily the actual emotional response
that occurred in the moment or remembered pain. This is
consistent with studies that have shown that intentions for
future behavior rely more strongly on how a similar past ex-
perience is remembered than on how it was experienced in the
Table 3 Correlations of experienced and recalled pain with the willingness variables
Whole-Study Willingness Cold-Pressor Willingness
Willingnessa Compensation (Open-ended)b Compensation (13-point scale)c Willingnessc Compensationc
r BF10 r BF10 r BF10 r BF10 r BF10
Experienced Pain – .07 0.14 .11 0.30 – .02 0.18 – .05 0.19 .03 0.18
Distress – .10 0.25 .13 0.42 – .06 0.19 .01 0.18 – .04 0.19
Positive affect .18** 3.27 – .02 0.09 – .22 0.52 .23 0.64 .03 0.19
Negative affect – .07 0.13 .10 0.24 – .06 0.19 .10 0.23 – .10 0.23
Recalled Pain – .11 0.30 .15* 0.78 – .14 0.28 – .08 0.20 – .02 0.18
Distress – .21** 14.58 .11 0.26 – .09 0.21 – .07 0.20 – .08 0.21
Positive affect .27** 399.57 – .06 0.12 – .26 0.85 .26 0.91 – .08 0.21
Negative affect – .17** 2.51 .09 0.19 .03 0.18 – .02 0.18 .04 0.19
Due to changes in the willingness questionnaire mid-study, sample size for each measure differ. a n = 233. b n = 184. c n = 49. ** p < .01; * p < .05.
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moment (e.g., Wirtz, Kruger, Napa Scollon, & Diener, 2003).
Due to the exploratory nature of these analyses and the in-
volvement of multiple comparisons, however, these results
should be interpreted cautiously, and additional research will
be necessary to assess the reliability of these findings.
These findings are particularly important in the healthcare
domain, where decisions to pursue medical care in the future
are based on memory for past healthcare experiences. Patients
may be more likely to schedule a routine colonoscopy, for
example, if they remember their previous colonoscopy as less
aversive (Redelmeier et al., 2003). In the present study we
aimed to examine whether changing memory for the pain
experienced during an aversive task might make participants
more willing to repeat that experience again in the future.
Although participants exposed to misinformation exhibited
greater distortion in their memories for their pain, we found
that this alteration did not influence willingness to repeat the
task again in the future. Perhaps changing memory for
emotional responses to the aversive experience, rather than
changing memory for physical pain, would be more effective
in increasing willingness to repeat the experience in the future.
This suggests that memory for pain may be used differently
from memory for affective reactions to pain when it comes to
making decisions for future behavior, even though pain and
affective reactions to pain are similarly susceptible to memory
distortion.
Detection measure
Following past research (Johansson et al., 2005), we included
two measures of detection: concurrent and retrospective.
Concurrent detectors spontaneously reported that the pain rat-
ings they were shown were not the pain ratings they had truly
made. This requires the participants to take initiative, and is
perhaps one reason why we observed such a low rate of con-
current detection (11%). By contrast, retrospective detectors
reported finding something strange about the process of the
computer reminding them of their pain ratings. However, they
had already been asked in the debriefing whether they had
found anything strange or surprising about the study, which
might have biased their response rate. Indeed, we found that a
small number of control participants were coded as retrospec-
tive detectors, illustrating that this measure may have a higher
false-positive rate. On the other hand, nondetectors had higher
levels of social desirability than did detectors in both mea-
sures, meaning that some participants in the nondetector
groups may have actually detected the misinformation but
did not demonstrate this due to their desire to respond favor-
ably to the researcher. The true rate of detectors likely lies
somewhere between the measures of concurrent detection
and retrospective detection employed in this study. Future
research might attempt to design measures of detection that
are less sensitive to demand characteristics.
Participants who detected the misinformation concurrently
reported more distress, more negative affect, and marginally
more pain than participants who did not detect the misinfor-
mation concurrently. This suggests that people may be more
vigilant to misinformation about their own pain ratings the
more distressing, negative, or painful their actual experience
was (see also Hall, Johansson, & Strandberg, 2012). This is
logical, as pain tends to grab a person’s attention (Eccleston &
Crombez, 1999). The more pain one experiences, the more
they are likely to attend to how they feel in that moment,
and the more likely they are to notice discrepancies between
misinformation and their actual report.
Social desirability
In addition to examining how social desirability related to the
tendency to detect misinformation, we also examined how
social desirability related to our other dependent variables of
interest. Higher levels of social desirability were not related to
pain and distress reported during the cold pressor, but were
related to recalling the cold pressor more favorably during the
second session. This speaks to the potential impact of demand
effects on reports of pain. Among the misinformation condi-
tion, social desirability was also related to a greater decrease in
reports of pain during the second session, suggesting that peo-
ple who have higher levels of social desirability are more
susceptible to misinformation.
Limitations
Our study was limited by the fact that we examined pain in a
laboratory setting, which may produce different responses
than in a real-world setting. Participants might have been less
attentive to alterations in their self-reported ratings in the lab-
oratory than in a setting where their health is directly impli-
cated, and thus may not have been as vigilant to misinforma-
tion. Furthermore, because the lab setting does not hold any
real-life health implications, participants might have been less
willing to repeat the same experience again than if they knew
that repeating the procedure would potentially benefit their
health. Therefore, if another study were conducted in a med-
ical setting, we might expect higher misinformation detection
rates, but also a greater willingness to repeat aversive proce-
dures. Future research would do well to test memory bias for
real-life procedures.
Conclusion
Memory of how a person felt in the past informs what that
person is willing to do in the future. Memory is susceptible to
bias, however, both from natural processes and external influ-
ences. Therefore, understanding the ways in which memory
for past experiences might be biased is important for
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predicting future behavior. This is particularly consequential
in the healthcare domain, where patients may make medical
decisions based on their memory for how painful a past expe-
rience was. The present study revealed that people can be
misled to believe they experienced less pain than they actually
reported during a cold pressor, and that this misinformation
can become incorporated into their memories for the experi-
ence. In this way, we were able to Badd a better end^ by
decreasing the amount of pain recalled from a painful experi-
ence. Unexpectedly, underestimated pain ratings did not trans-
late to a greater willingness to repeat study procedures in the
future. Instead, the recalled emotional reactions to the cold
pressor, such as recalled distress, negative affect, and positive
affect, were more strongly related to willingness to participate
in the entire study procedure again. Therefore, memory for
physical pain, although it was shown to be malleable to mis-
information, may not be as integral to future decision making
as is memory for emotional responses following the pain.
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